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In this paper, we derive the optimal investment and annuitization strategies for a
retiree whose objective is to minimize the probability of lifetime ruin, namely the prob-
ability that a fixed consumption strategy will lead to zero wealth while the individual
is still alive. Recent papers in the insurance economics literature have examined utility-
maximizing annuitization strategies. Others in the probability, finance, and risk man-
agement literature have derived shortfall-minimizing investment and hedging strategies
given a limited amount of initial capital. This paper brings the two strands of research
together. Our model pre-supposes a retiree who does not currently have sufficient wealth
to purchase a life annuity that will yield her exogenously desired fixed consumption
level. She seeks the asset allocation and annuitization strategy that will minimize the
probability of lifetime ruin. We demonstrate that because of the binary nature of the
investor’s goal, she will not annuitize any of her wealth until she can fully cover her
desired consumption with a life annuity. We derive a variational inequality that governs
the ruin probability and the optimal strategies, and we demonstrate that the problem
can be recast as a related optimal stopping problem which yields a free-boundary prob-
lem that is more tractable. We numerically calculate the ruin probability and optimal
strategies and examine how they change as we vary the mortality assumption and pa-
rameters of the financial model. Moreover, for the special case of exponential future
lifetime, we solve the (dual) problem explicitly. As a byproduct of our calculations, we
are able to quantify the reduction in lifetime ruin probability that comes from being
able to manage the investment portfolio dynamically and purchase annuities.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
More individuals are responsible now than in recent decades for managing their retire-
ment portfolios through defined contribution plans, such as 401(k)s and 403(b)s, in lieu of
defined benefit pension plans. Indeed, in 1998, 62.7% of individuals who participated in a
retirement plan had a defined contribution plan as their primary plan, much higher than
the 49.8% found in 1993 (Copeland 2002). In a recent issue of The Actuary (Parikh 2003),
Jeff Mohrenweiser states that “an [American Council of Life Insurers] report found that
seventy-one percent of the women and sixty percent of the men surveyed are concerned
that it will be difficult to make their retirement savings last a lifetime.” This concern
is justified; VanDerhei and Copeland (2003) report that American retirees will have at
least $45 billion less in retirement income in 2030 than what they will need to cover their
expenses. This shortfall highlights the need for individuals to receive good advice about
managing their wealth.
Global pension reform and the trend toward privatization have focused much academic
and practitioner attention on the market for voluntary life annuities, as an alternative to
defined benefit pensions. A fixed-payout life annuity is a financial instrument that pays a
fixed amount periodically (e.g., monthly or annually) throughout the life of the recipient;
the payments are contingent on the recipient’s survival. Since they provide guaranteed,
periodic income, life annuities are instrumental in helping individuals sustain a given
level of consumption. Recent proposed legislation giving tax incentives for individuals
who purchase these instruments testifies to their potential effectiveness in preventing
poverty in retirement (Cummins 2004). While life annuities themselves are hundreds
of years old—see Poterba (1997) for a brief history—it is only recently that they have
attracted the attention of noted financial and insurance economists, such as Feldstein
and Ranguelova (2001), as an alternative to Social Security.
Though life annuities do provide income security in retirement, very few retirees choose
a life annuity over a lump sum. According to a recent survey, 86% of retirees said that
guaranteed lifetime income is “very important,” and 87% of retirees said that they would
like to receive their pension as a series of regular payments for life (Society of Actuaries
2004); however, very few people actually elect a life annuity. Indeed, in a recent compre-
hensive Health and Retirement Survey, only 1.57% of the respondents reported annuity
income; similarly, only 8.0% of respondents with a defined contribution pension plan
selected an annuity payout.
In a well-cited paper from the public economics literature, Yaari (1965) proved that in
the absence of bequest motives—and in a deterministic financial economy—consumers
will annuitize all of their liquid wealth. Richard (1975) generalized this result to a
stochastic environment, and a recent paper by Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2003)
demonstrates the robustness of the Yaari (1965) result. In practice, there are market im-
perfections, and frictions preclude full annuitization. Similarly, Brugiavini (1993), Kapur
and Orszag (1999), Brown (2001), and Milevsky and Young (2003) provide theoretical
and empirical guidance on the optimal time to annuitize under various market structures.
The common theme of the above-mentioned papers is the presumption of a ratio-
nal utility-maximizing economic agent with rigid inter-temporal preferences and pre-
specified relative risk aversion. While this von-Neumann-Morgenstern framework is the
basis of most of microeconomic foundations, it is notably difficult to apply as a tool for
normative advice.
Recently, though, a variety of papers in the risk and portfolio management liter-
ature have revitalized the Roy (1952) Safety-First rule and applied the concept to
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probability maximization of achieving certain investment goals. For example, Browne
(1995, 1999a,b,c) derived the optimal dynamic strategy for a portfolio manager who is
interested in minimizing the probability of shortfall. Indeed, there is something intuitively
appealing about minimizing the probability of shortfall that lends itself to asset alloca-
tion advice. In fact, in the United States, the Nobel laureate William Sharpe has founded
a financial services advisory firm that is largely based on using probabilities to provide
investment advice.
Therefore, motivated by the desire to apply probability optimization to problems faced
by retirees, we find the optimal annuity-purchasing strategy for an individual who seeks to
minimize the probability that she outlives her wealth, also called the probability of lifetime
ruin. In other words, we assume the retiree will maintain a pre-specified (exogenous)
consumption level, and we determine the optimal investment strategy, as well as the
optimal time to annuitize, in order to minimize the probability that wealth will reach zero
while the individual is still alive.
Milevsky and Robinson (2000) introduced the probability of lifetime ruin as a risk-
metric for retirees, albeit in a static environment. As an extension of that work, Young
(2004) determined the optimal dynamic investment policy for an individual who consumes
at a specific rate, who invests in a complete financial market, and who does not buy
annuities. By contrast, we allow the individual to buy annuities, as well as to invest in a
financial market. The irreversibility of annuity purchases and their illiquidity creates a
complex optimization environment, which renders many classical results inoperable. Of
course, these same challenges are what make the problem mathematically interesting.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the concept of self-
annuitization and provide some general statements about the probability of lifetime ruin
under such a strategy. We, then, present our formal optimization model and use optimal
stochastic control to derive a variational inequality that governs the ruin probability and
optimal strategies. We show that the annuitization strategy is a barrier strategy defined
by the barrier at which the marginal ruin probability with respect to annuity income
and the (adjusted) marginal ruin probability with respect to wealth are equal. This type
of result—namely, taking no action until the marginal benefit is at least equal to the
marginal cost—is seen often in the economics literature. The annuity-purchasing prob-
lem is qualitatively similar to the problem of optimal consumption and investment in
the presence of proportional transaction costs. The difference between the two prob-
lems is that for us, once the individual’s wealth reaches the barrier, then she annuitizes
all her wealth, and the “game” is over, as we show in Section 3. Friedman and Shen
(2002) applied similar stochastic control methods to problems in retirement planning and
insurance.
In Section 3, we reduce the dimension of the variational inequality obtained in Sec-
tion 2. In Section 2, the probability of lifetime ruin is given as a function of the current
time, the wealth w at that time, and the annuity income A at that time. If c denotes the
(fixed) desired consumption rate, then it turns out the probability of lifetime ruin is a
function of z = w/(c − A) and time, so we can reduce the dimension of the problem by
1. We, then, study properties of the optimal investment and annuity-purchasing poli-
cies. We show that if wealth exceeds the actuarial present value of the investor’s lifetime
shortfall in consumption, then she will purchase a lump-sum annuity to guarantee her
desired consumption rate so that she will never ruin. Conversely, if wealth is less than the
actuarial present value of the shortfall in consumption, then the individual will buy no
annuity at that time but wait until wealth is great enough, a rather surprising bang-bang
result that is inherited from the nature of the investor’s goal and stands in contrast to the
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instantaneous control policy that would apply if the objective were to maximize expected
utility of lifetime consumption and bequest (Milevsky and Young 2003).
In Section 4, we use duality techniques to transform the nonlinear partial differential
equation for the probability of lifetime ruin (with known boundary conditions) to a linear
free-boundary problem. In Section 5, we solve the free-boundary problem for a special
case and contrast our results with those in Section 2.1, where no annuities or risky assets
were available to the individual. In this way, we quantify the benefits of dynamic portfolio
management, in which the portfolio includes life annuities and a risky asset. In Section 6,
we use the connection between free-boundary problems and variational inequalities for
optimal stopping problems in order to compute ruin probabilities and optimal strategies
for more general cases than that considered in Section 5. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. PROBABILITY OF LIFETIME RUIN
In this section, we formulate our models for the probability of lifetime ruin—first in the
case of deterministic returns, then in the case of stochastic returns.
2.1. Self-Annuitization with Deterministic Returns
In this section, we consider a simple model in which an individual can invest only
in a riskless asset earning rate r. We assume that she begins with wealth 1 and self-
annuitizes; that is, she consumes a level amount c per year until she dies or runs out of
money, whichever comes first. We compute the time of ruin, and under the assumption
of exponential future lifetime, we compute the probability of lifetime ruin. In Section 5.2,
we contrast these results with those for an investor who can trade dynamically between
riskless and risky assets and who can purchase annuities instead of self-annuitizing.
We start with a future lifetime random variable τ d that is exponentially distributed, for
which the probability of survival is given by
Pr[τd > t] = e−λt,(2.1)
in which λ is the instantaneous hazard rate (or force of mortality). The greater the hazard
rate λ, the lower the probability of survival to any given age t.
In this paper, we refer to prices of life annuities. Formally, the price (or present value)
of a payout annuity (for life, with no guarantee period) that pays $1 per year continuously
is computed via ∫ ∞
0
e−rtPr[τd > t] dt.(2.2)
It is effectively equal to the present value of $1 per year discounted by the riskless rate
and the probability of survival. The greater the interest rate, the lower the present value
of the life annuity. For exponential mortality with hazard rate λ, the annuity price equals∫ ∞
0
e−rte−λt dt = 1
r + λ.(2.3)
Note that the hazard rate acts as a discount factor in equation (2.3). Actuaries often say
when computing such an expression that they are “discounting for interest and mortality.”
Thus, for example, if the hazard rate is λ= 0.05 (which means that future life expectancy
is 20 years) and the interest rate in the (annuity) market is r = 0.07, the price of $1 per year
for life is 1/0.12 = 8.33 dollars. Stated differently, $1 of initial premium will yield a fixed
annuity payout of λ + r = 0.12 dollars per year for life. However, when the (initial) future
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life expectancy is only 10 years, which implies the hazard rate is λ = 0.10, then under an
r = 0.07 interest rate, the cost of $1 for life is only 1/0.17 = 5.88 dollars. Equivalently,
the payout per initial dollar of premium is 0.17 dollars per year.
In the deterministic case, we use the function W (t) to denote the wealth at time t of
the retiree assuming she does not annuitize. Instead, she consumes a constant amount
c per year until she either runs out of money or she dies (whichever comes first). We
quantify the dynamics of the wealth process and compute the probability she will run out
of money while she is still alive. To simplify our work, we assume that there is only one
interest rate r in the economy (i.e., no term structure or expenses) and that all annuities
are priced (fairly) as a function only of the hazard rate and interest rate (i.e., we ignore
loading and expenses because these can be absorbed in the pricing hazard rate; see the
discussion following (2.9)).
Formally, under a self-annuitization strategy, the wealth process of the retiree obeys
the ordinary differential equation:
dW (t) = (rW (t) − c) dt, W(0) = 1.(2.4)
The individual retires with $1 of wealth, invests at a rate of r, and consumes at a rate of
c. Intuitively, therefore, wealth increases at the interest rate at which money is invested
minus the consumption rate. The solution to this ordinary differential equation is





, t ≤ t∗,(2.5)
and 0 after time t∗, in which t∗ is the point at which the process hits zero (i.e., the
individual is ruined). One can interpret this expression for W (t) as the value at time t of the
initial $1 minus the accumulated value of the continuous withdrawal due to consumption
at rate c.
Now, assume the consumption rate is set equal to c = λ + r, which is the amount of
life annuity income that $1 will provide. In this self-annuitization case, the ruin time t∗,









By substituting (2.6) into (2.1), we learn that the probability of surviving to the point
at which the funds are exactly exhausted is






In Section 5.2, we contrast the probability of lifetime ruin in the deterministic case (2.7)
with the probability of lifetime ruin when we allow random returns.
2.2. Stochastic Returns
In this subsection, we formalize the optimal annuity-purchasing and optimal invest-
ment problem for an individual who seeks to minimize the probability that she outlives
her wealth. A priori, we allow the individual to buy annuities in lump sums or continu-
ously, whichever is optimal. Our results are similar to those of Dixit and Pindyck (1994,
pp. 359ff), which are given in the context of real options. They consider the problem
of a firm’s (irreversible) capacity expansion. In our model, annuity purchases are also
irreversible, and this leads to the similarity in results.
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We assume that the individual can invest in a riskless asset whose price at time s, Xs,
follows the process dXs = rXs ds, Xt = x > 0, for some fixed r ≥ 0, as in the previous
subsection. However, unlike the previous subsection, the individual can also invest in a
risky asset whose price at time s, Ss, follows geometric Brownian motion given by{
dSs = μSs ds + σ Ss dBs,
St = S > 0,
(2.8)
in whichμ> r,σ >0, and Bs is a standard Brownian motion with respect to a filtration {Fs}
of the probability space (,F, Pr). Let Ws be the wealth at time s of the individual (after
possibly purchasing annuities at that time), and let π s be the amount that the decision
maker invests in the risky asset at time s. It follows that the amount invested in the riskless
asset is Ws − πs. Also, the decision maker consumes at a constant rate of c.
Our economy can be either real or nominal. When our model is interpreted in nominal
terms, then the fixed consumption rate c is nominal, and we assume that the individual
buys annuities that pay a fixed nominal amount. In practice, of course, this exposes the
retiree to inflation risk since c today will buy much more than c in 20 years. However, if c
is real, then we assume that the individual (only) has access to annuities that are indexed
to inflation and thereby pay a fixed real amount. Also, in this case, the returns on the
riskless and risky assets are stated in real returns. We prefer to think of the model in
real terms, and our numerical examples are presented in real terms so that inflation risk,
which would be a problem if c were stated in nominal terms, is not an issue.
We employ a modified version of standard actuarial notation as in Bowers et al. (1997).
We write λS(t) to denote the individual-specific hazard rate at age t. Similarly, λO denotes
the objective hazard rate function used to price annuities. The actuarial present value of
a life annuity that pays $1 per year continuously to an individual aged t based on the
hazard rate function λO is written ā(t). The (objective) probability that our individual
aged t survives an additional s years equals exp(− ∫ t+st λO(u) du). It is the analog of e−λs
in the case for which τ d is exponentially distributed, as in (2.1). As in (2.2), to compute
the actuarial present value of the life annuity, we discount the payment stream of $1 per












Throughout this paper, time coincides with the age of the individual; that is, at time t,
the individual is age t. Note that the discount for mortality in (2.9) makes ā(t) < 1/r , the
price of a perpetuity that pays $1 per year continuously.
To clarify, by ā(t), we mean the actual market price of the life annuity for an individual
aged t. We deliberately refrain from discussing anti-selection, which creates the wedge
between individual-specific and pricing (or objective) hazard rates. In addition, we omit
actuarial loading fees, agent commissions, and other market imperfections that only add
to the cost of annuities and can be absorbed in the pricing hazard rate.
The individual has a nonnegative income rate at time (or age) s of As after any annuity
purchases at that time (As− before any annuity purchases at time s). Initial income could
include Social Security benefits and defined benefit pension benefits, for example, but
we assume that additional income only arises from buying life annuities by using money
from current wealth. We assume that she can purchase a life annuity at the price of ā(s)
per dollar of annuity income at time s. Thus, wealth follows the process
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dW s = [rW s− + (μ − r )πs− + As− − c] ds + σπs− dBs − ā(s) dAs,
Wt = w ≥ 0,
At = A ≥ 0.
(2.10)
The negative sign for the subscript on the random processes denotes the left-hand limit
of those quantities before any (lump sum) annuity purchases.
In order to reduce the number of variables in this problem, we define Xs = c − As. Xs
denotes the excess consumption that the individual requires; in other words, Xs is the net
consumption. By formulating the problem in terms of Xs, we will be able to reduce the
dimension of the problem more easily in Section 4. With this new random variable, (2.10)
becomes ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
dW s = [rW s− + (μ − r )πs− − Xs−] ds + σπs− dBs + ā(s) dXs,
Wt = w ≥ 0,
Xt = x ≥ 0.
(2.11)
We assume that the decision maker seeks to minimize, over admissible strategies
{πs, Xs}, her probability of lifetime ruin, namely, the probability that her wealth drops
to zero before she dies. Admissible strategies {πs, Xs} are those that are measurable with
respect to the information available at time s, namely Fs , that restrict the excess con-
sumption process X to be nonnegative and nonincreasing (i.e., life annuity purchases are
irreversible), and that result in (2.11) having a unique solution; see Karatzas and Shreve
(1998), for example. Note that π s is unconstrained; thus, the investment in the risky asset
can exceed current wealth (and often does, as we will see in Section 6.3). The individual
values her probability of lifetime ruin via her specific hazard rate, while annuities are
priced by using the objective hazard rate.
Denote the random time of death of our individual by τ d , as in the previous subsection,
and the random time of lifetime ruin by τ 0; that is, τ 0 is the time at which wealth reaches
zero. Thus, the probability of lifetime ruin ψ for the individual at time t defined on D̄ =
{(w, x, t) : 0 ≤ w ≤ xā(t), x ≥ 0, t ≥ 0} is given by
ψ(w, x, t) = inf
{πs ,Xs }
Pr[τ0 < τd | Wt = w, Xt = x, τd > t, τ0 > t].(2.12)
Note that if w ≥ xā(t), then the individual can purchase an annuity that will guarantee
her an income of x = c − A, which added to her income of A, gives her income to match
her consumption rate of c. Thus, ψ(w , x, t) = 0 for w ≥ xā(t). If life annuities were not
available, securing lifetime income would necessitate acquiring a perpetuity, which would
cost 1/r per $1 of income, much more than the life annuity. This was the problem analyzed
by Young (2004).
We continue with a formal derivation of the associated Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman
(HJB) variational inequality. First, note that the problem is one that combines continuous
control (via the investment strategy π s) and singular control (via the excess consumption
strategy Xs = c − As). Indeed, suppose that we could write dXs = χs ds for some rate χ s;
that is, suppose that it is optimal to buy annuities at a continuous rate. Then, the HJB
equation would contain a term of the form χ ā(t)ψx(w, x, t), which arises from (2.11),
and that term would be minimized by setting χ = 0 or χ = ∞ depending on the sign
of ψx. Therefore, no such rate χ s exists, and the problem of choosing the optimal excess
consumption strategy is one of singular control; see Harrison and Taksar (1983) for an
early relevant reference in mathematical finance.
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Now, suppose that at the point (w , x, t), it is optimal not to purchase any annuities. It
follows from Itô’s lemma that ψ satisfies the equation
λS(t)ψ = ψt + (rw − x)ψw + min
π
[




Because the above policy is in general suboptimal, (2.13) holds as an inequality; that is,
for all (w , x, t),
λS(t)ψ ≤ ψt + (rw − x)ψw + min
π
[




Next, assume that at the point (w , x, t), it is optimal to buy an annuity instanta-
neously. In other words, assume that the investor moves instantly from (w , x, t) to
(w − ā(t)	x, x − 	x, t), for some 	x > 0. Then, the optimality of this decision implies
that
ψ(w, x, t) = ψ(w − ā(t)	x, x − 	x, t),(2.15)
which in turns yields
ā(t)ψw (w, x, t) + ψx(w, x, t) = 0.(2.16)
Note that the lump-sum purchase is such that (the negative of) the derivative of the prob-
ability of lifetime ruin with respect to excess consumption equals the adjusted derivative
with respect to wealth, in which we adjust by the cost of $1 of annuity income ā(t). This
is parallel to many results in economics. Indeed, the derivative of the probability of life-
time ruin with respect to excess consumption can be thought of as the marginal utility
of the benefit, while the adjusted derivative with respect to wealth can be thought of as
(the negative of) the marginal utility of the cost. We say “negative” here because ψ is
decreasing with respect to w . Thus, the lump-sum purchase forces the marginal utilities
of benefit and cost to equal.
However, such a lump-sum purchasing policy is in general suboptimal; therefore, (2.16)
holds as an inequality and becomes
ā(t)ψw (w, x, t) + ψx(w, x, t) ≤ 0.(2.17)
By combining (2.14) and (2.17), we obtain the HJB variational inequality (2.18) below
associated with the probability of ruin ψ given in (2.12). The following result can be
proved as in Zariphopoulou (1992), for example.
PROPOSITION 2.1. The probability of lifetime ruin is a constrained viscosity solution of
the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman variational inequality
max
[
λS(t)ψ − ψt − (rw − x)ψw − min
π
[
(μ − r )πψw + 12σ
2π2ψww
]




In the next section, we show that the barrier in (2.16) is the line w = xā(t); thus, the
individual will annuitize when she has sufficient wealth to cover her shortfall of x =
c − A. If wealth and annuity income initially lie to the right of the barrier at time t,
that is, w ≥ xā(t), then the individual will immediately spend a lump sum of wealth to
guarantee that the probability of lifetime ruin is zero. Otherwise, the annuity income is
constant when wealth is low enough, that is, w < xā(t). Once wealth is high enough, that
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is, w = xā(t), the individual will spend her wealth to guarantee an income rate of x + A =
c to match her consumption rate of c.
Thus, as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 359ff) or in Zariphopoulou (1992), we have
discovered that the optimal annuity-purchasing scheme is a type of barrier control. Other
barrier control policies appear in finance and insurance. In finance, Zariphopoulou (1999,
2001) reviews the role of barrier policies in optimal investment in the presence of transac-
tion costs; also see the references within her two articles. See Gerber (1979) for a classic
text on risk theory in which he includes a section on optimal dividend payout and shows
that it follows a type of barrier control. See Neuberger (2002) for an analysis that is similar
to ours in the setting of maximizing expected utility of consumption.
3. REDUCING THE DIMENSION OF THE MINIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section, we show that we can reduce the dimension of the variational inequality
(2.18) by transforming the ruin probability ψ(w , x, t) to a function of two variables. We
also show that the barrier described by (2.16) corresponds with the line w = xā(t).
The probability of lifetime ruin ψ is a function of the ratio z = w/x and time t. Indeed,
ψ(w, x, t) = ψ(z, 1, t) by scaling the entire problem by x = c − A. This observation is
also made in Milevsky and Robinson (2000), where the probability of lifetime ruin is
shown to depend only on the ratio of current wealth to desired consumption. Davis and
Norman (1990) and Shreve and Soner (1994) use a similar transformation in the problem
of consumption and investment in the presence of transaction costs. Also, Duffie et al.
(1997) and Koo (1998) use a similar transformation to study optimal consumption and
investment with stochastic income.
Thus, define V by
V(z, t) = ψ(z, 1, t),(3.1)
so that ψ(w, x, t) = V (z, t), from which it follows that ψt = Vt, ψw = 1x Vz, ψww =
( 1x )
2Vzz, and ψx = − zx Vz. Then, the barrier equation in (2.16) becomes
zVz = ā(t)Vz;(3.2)
thus, either Vz = 0 at the barrier or z = ā(t) there. We now argue by contradiction that
Vz = 0 at the barrier. Suppose that Vz = 0 at the barrier; then, we can show that the
barrier is given by z = 1/r. In other words, the individual buys no life annuities until her
wealth is sufficient to buy a perpetuity to cover her excess consumption. However, note
that (2.9) implies ā(t) < 1/r ; that is, life annuities are cheaper than perpetuities. Thus,
the individual’s wealth will never reach w = x/r because she will certainly buy an annuity
when she has enough to cover her excess consumption (i.e., when w = xā(t)) and thereby
never ruin. Therefore, z = ā(t) defines the barrier, and z < ā(t) defines the region for
which annuity buying is not optimal.
We have just shown that the individual will buy no annuities unless w ≥ xā(t), in which
case the individual will spend at least xā(t) to buy a life annuity to guarantee income of
x = c − A from the annuity. This income plus the income A covers the consumption rate
c, and the individual will not ruin. Therefore, the individual will not buy an annuity until
she can guarantee that she will not ruin, a type of “bang-bang” strategy that results from
the all-or-nothing nature of her goal.
We are now ready to give a complete formulation of the probability of lifetime ruin ψ .
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PROPOSITION 3.1. The probability of lifetime ruin ψ in (2.12) is given by
ψ(w, x, t) = V(z, t) if z := w/x < ā(t); otherwise, ψ(w, x, t) = 0,
in which V solves
λS(t)V = Vt + (rz − 1)Vz + min
π̂
(








S(u) du)E[V(Z∗s , s) | Zt = z] = 0, in which Z∗s is the optimally
controlled Zs.
For a given set of controls, note that Zs equals the process Ws when x = 1. One can prove
Proposition 3.1 formally by using an approach similar to the one in Harrison and Taksar
(1983). In fact, the transversality condition arises from the (here-unstated) verification
lemma underlying this proposition. In the next section, we show that (3.3) has a smooth
solution in the classical sense.
4. LINEARIZING THE EQUATION FOR V VIA DUALITY ARGUMENTS
In this section, we transform the nonlinear boundary-value problem in (3.3) to a linear
free-boundary problem via the Legendre transform; see Karatzas and Shreve (1998). To
this end, we first eliminate the λS(t) V term from (3.3) by defining








It follows that (3.3) becomes
ft + (rz − 1) fz + min
π̂
[




with boundary conditions f (0, t) = exp(− ∫ t0 λS(u) du) and f (ā(t), t) = 0 and with
transversality condition lims→∞E[ f (Z∗s , s) | Zt = z] = 0. This condition can be rewrit-
ten as limt→∞ f (z, t) = 0 with probability 1 because 0 ≤ f ≤ 1.
Next, consider the concave dual of f defined via the Legendre transform by
f̃ (y, t) = min
z>0
[ f (z, t) + zy].(4.2)
The critical value z∗ solves the equation fz(z, t) + y = 0; thus, z∗ = I(−y, t), in which I is
the inverse of f z with respect to z. It follows that
f̃ (y, t) = f [I(−y, t), t] + yI(−y, t).(4.3)
Note that
f̃ y(y, t) = − fz[I(−y, t)]Iy(−y, t) + I(−y, t) − yIy(−y, t)
= yIy(−y, t) + I(−y, t) − yIy(−y, t)
= I(−y, t).
(4.4)
We can retrieve the function f from f̃ by the relationship
f (z, t) = max
y>0
[ f̃ (y, t) − zy].(4.5)
Indeed, the critical value y∗ solves the equation f̃ y(y, t) − z = 0; thus, y∗ = −fz(z, t),
and
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f̃ (y∗, t) − zy∗ = f [I(−y∗, t), t] + y∗ I(−y∗, t) − zy∗
= f [I( fz(z, t), t), t] − fz(z, t)I( fz(z, t), t) + zfz(z, t)
= f (z, t) − zfz(z, t) + zfz(z, t)
= f (z, t),
in which we use equation (4.3) for the first equality.
Next, note that
f̃ yy(y, t) = −Iy(−y, t) = −1/ fzz[I(−y, t), t],(4.6)
and
f̃ t(y, t) = fz[I(−y, t), t]It(−y, t) + ft[I(−y, t), t] + yIt(−y, t)
= −yIt(−y, t) + ft[I(−y, t), t] + yIt(−y, t)
= ft[I(−y, t), t].
(4.7)
In the partial differential equation for f , let z = I(−y, t) to obtain




)2 ( fz[I(−y, t), t])2
fzz[I(−y, t), t] = 0.
Rewrite this equation in terms of f̃ to get
f̃ t(y, t) + (r I(−y, t) − 1)(−y) − m (−y)
2
−1/ f̃ yy(y, t)
= 0,
in which m = 12 ( μ − rσ )2, or equivalently,
f̃ t(y, t) − ry f̃ y(y, t) + my2 f̃ yy(y, t) + y = 0,(4.8)
with boundary conditions given implicitly by f (0, t) = exp(− ∫ t0 λS(u) du) and
f (ā(t), t) = 0.
Now, consider the boundary conditions f (0, t) = exp(− ∫ t0 λS(u) du) and f (ā(t), t) =
0. Because f z < 0 is strictly increasing with respect to z, we have y0(t) > yb(t) ≥ 0 for all
t ≥ 0, in which y0(t) and yb(t) are defined by
y0(t) = − fz(0, t),(4.9)
and
yb(t) = − fz(ā(t), t).(4.10)
We use subscript 0 to denote the point corresponding to wealth equal to 0, and we
use subscript b to denote the point corresponding to the value of wealth at which the
individual buys a life annuity.
Thus, the boundary conditions become







, for f̃ y(y0(t), t) = 0,(4.11)
and
f̃ (yb(t), t) = ā(t)yb(t), for f̃ y(yb(t), t) = ā(t).(4.12)
The transversality condition limt→∞ f (z, t) = 0 becomes limt→∞ f̃ (y, t) = 0. Note that
the first equations in (4.11) and (4.12) are reminiscent of value matching conditions,
while the second equations are reminiscent of smooth pasting conditions. We exploit
this observation in Section 6, where we express f̃ as the value function for an optimal
stopping problem. Thus, we are able to solve the free-boundary problem numerically.
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Before pursuing this numerical method, we obtain an exact solution for ψ in a special
case in Section 5.
5. SOLUTION OF THE FREE-BOUNDARY PROBLEM FOR
A SPECIAL CASE: CONSTANT HAZARD RATE
Throughout this section, we assume that the forces of mortality are constant; that is, that
λS(t) ≡ λS and λO(t) ≡ λO for all t ≥ 0. In this case, the ruin probability ψ is independent
of time, and the partial differential equation in (3.3) is an ordinary differential equation.
We use this time-homogeneity to compute a “implicit” analytical solution of ψ .
5.1. Solution of the Boundary-Value Problem
If we assume that the forces of mortality are constant, (3.3) becomes the ordinary
differential equation:
λSV = (rz − 1)V′ + min
π̂
(





with boundary conditions V (0) = 1 and V (1/(r + λO)) = 0.
If we define the concave dual of V by Ṽ(n) = minz>0[V(z) + zn], as in Section 4, then
we obtain the following free-boundary problem for Ṽ:
−λSṼ(n) − (r − λS)nṼ′(n) + mn2Ṽ′′(n) + n = 0,(5.2)
with boundary conditions
Ṽ(n0) = 1, for Ṽ′(n0) = 0,(5.3)
and
Ṽ(nb) = nbr + λO , for Ṽ
′(nb) = 1r + λO .(5.4)
The general solution of (5.2) is
Ṽ(n) = D1nB1 + D2nB2 + nr ,(5.5)
with D1 and D2 constants determined by the boundary conditions, and with B1 and B2
given by
B1 = 12m [(r − λ
S + m) +
√
(r − λS + m)2 + 4mλS] > 1,(5.6)
and
B2 = 12m [(r − λ
S + m) −
√
(r − λS + m)2 + 4mλS] < 0.(5.7)
The boundary conditions at nb give us
D1n
B1












r + λO .(5.9)
Solve equations (5.8) and (5.9) to get D1 and D2 in terms of nb:
D1 = − λ
O
r (r + λO)
1 − B2
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D2 = − λ
O
r (r + λO)
B1 − 1
B1 − B2 n
1−B2
b < 0.(5.11)
























Equation (5.12) gives us an equation for the ratio n0/nb > 1. To check that (5.12) has a
unique solution greater than 1, note that the left-hand side (1) equals λO/(r + λO) < 1
when we set n0/nb = 1, (2) goes to infinity as n0/nb goes to infinity, and (3) is strictly
increasing with respect to n0/nb.





0 + 1r = 1n0 to get
− λ
O





















Substitute for n0/nb in equation (5.13), and solve for n0. Finally, we can get nb from
nb = n0n0/nb ,(5.14)
and D1 and D2 from equations (5.10) and (5.11), respectively.











in which the critical value n∗ solves
D1 B1nB1−1 + D2 B2nB2−1 + 1r = z.(5.16)
Thus, for a given value of z = w/x, solve (5.16) for n and plug that value of n into (5.15)
to get ψ(w , x) = V (z).
Also of interest is the amount invested in the risky asset, especially as wealth approaches
the annuitization level x/(r + λO).




= −xμ − r
σ
nṼ′′(n).
Now, nṼ′′(n) = D1 B1(B1 − 1)nB1−1 + D2 B2(B2 − 1)nB2−1, so after substituting for D1
and D2 from equations (5.10) and (5.11), respectively, the optimal investment in the risky
asset (in terms of n) becomes
xπ̂∗(z)|z=I(−n) = xμ − r
σ
λO
r (r + λO)















In particular, as n approaches nb, the point at which the individual annuitizes all her
wealth, the amount invested in the risky asset approaches











independent of σ and λS. Note that the expression in (5.18) is a multiple of the difference
between the cost of the perpetuity and the cost of the annuity.
In addition to the amount invested in the risky asset, it is useful to know how that
amount changes as one’s wealth changes. Note that the derivative of π∗(w , x) with respect
to w has the same sign as the derivative of nṼ′′(n) with respect to n. Thus, the amount of
wealth invested in the risky asset decreases with respect to wealth if and only if
nṼ′′′(n) + Ṽ′′(n) < 0 for all n ∈ (nb, n0).(5.19)
After some elementary algebra, we determine that (5.19) holds if λS < r, while if λS is
sufficiently larger than r, then the amount of wealth invested in the risky asset increases
with wealth, as we will see in the example in the next section.
5.2. Numerical Examples
In this section, we present numerical examples to demonstrate the results of Section 5.1.
We will calculate the probability of lifetime ruin ψ(w , x) in the presence of annuities with
the corresponding probability ψ0(w , x) when the individual cannot buy annuities, the
problem studied in Young (2004). From that work, we know that the probability of
lifetime ruin ψ0(w , x) is given by
ψ0(w, x) = (1 − rz)p, for 0 ≤ z < 1r , 0 ≤ z ≤ 1/r ,(5.20)
in which z = w/x, and p = 12r [(r + λS + m) +
√
(r + λS + m)2 − 4rλS] > 1. Also, the
corresponding optimal investment in the risky asset π∗0 (w, x) is given by
π∗0 (w, x) =
μ − r
σ
· 1 − rz
r (p − 1) , 0 ≤ z ≤ 1/r .(5.21)
Note that in this case, the probability of lifetime ruin is 0 when z ≥ 1/r because when
(relative) wealth is that large, then the individual can invest all her income in the riskless
asset and fund her consumption with the earnings from that asset. Also, note that π∗0
approaches 0 as z approaches 1/r. From (5.18), we know that π∗ does not approach 0 as
z approaches ā(t) when life annuities are available in the market.
EXAMPLE 5.1. Constant Real Dollar Consumed: Suppose we have the following values
of the parameters: λS = λO = 0.04; the hazard rate is constant such that the expected future lifetime
is 25 years. r = 0.02; the riskless rate of return is 2% over inflation. μ = 0.06; the drift of the risky asset is 6% over inflation. σ = 0.20; the volatility of the risky asset is 20%. c = 1; the individual consumes one unit of wealth per year. A = 0; without loss of generality, we assume that annuity income is zero.
It follows that the excess consumption x = c − A = 1 and that z = w/x = w . The cost
of the annuity is 1/(r + λO) = 1/0.06 = $16.66̄, while the cost of the perpetuity much
larger at 1/r = 1/0.02 = $50.00. In this example, D1 = −103.4, D2 = −0.002642, n0 =
0.081, and nb = 0.044. In Table 5.1, we give the probabilities of ruin ψ and ψ0 and the
corresponding optimal investments in the risky asset, π∗ and π∗0 , respectively.
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TABLE 5.1
Probability of Lifetime Ruin and Optimal Investment in Risky Asset
w ψ(w , 1) π∗(w , 1) ψ0(w , 1) π∗0 (w, 1)
0.0 1.000 25.283 1.000 20.711
0.5 0.960 25.300 0.966 20.504
1.0 0.921 25.327 0.933 20.296
2.0 0.844 25.415 0.870 19.882
5.0 0.633 25.977 0.698 18.640
7.5 0.474 26.829 0.574 17.604
10.0 0.330 28.066 0.467 16.569
12.0 0.223 29.345 0.392 15.740
14.0 0.123 30.885 0.326 14.912
16.0 0.030 32.680 0.268 14.083
16.5 0.0074 33.168 0.255 13.876
16.6 0.00296 33.267 0.252 13.835
16.66 0.000296 33.327 0.251 13.810
16.666 0.0000296 33.333 0.251 13.807
20.0 0.000 n.a. 0.175 12.426
There are a variety of interesting lessons that can be gleaned from the numbers in
Table 5.1. First, for very low values of wealth, the probability of lifetime ruin is (obvi-
ously) close to 100%, but it is quite insensitive to whether or not annuities are available.
Intuitively, the reason is that the costs of the annuity and the perpetuity are both relatively
far from current wealth and are therefore probabilistically inaccessible. However, as the
value of wealth increases, the probability of lifetime ruin declines, and the rate of proba-
bility improvement is much higher when the life annuity is available. In fact, as we get very
close to the cost of the life annuity, $16.66̄, the probability of lifetime ruin approaches
zero—since as soon as that level is reached the entire wealth will be annuitized—while
the cost of the perpetuity is still a distance away at $50.00.
As predicted by equation (5.18), as wealth approaches the cost of the life annuity, the
equity allocation moves toward 33.33̄ = 50.00 − 16.66̄, the difference between the cost
of the perpetuity and the cost of an annuity. Another use of the results in Table 5.1
is to invert the ψ function and solve for the current level of wealth-to-consumption
needed to maintain a lifetime ruin probability under some pre-specified level. Thus, for
example, if the retiree is interested in having at least a 95% chance of lifetime consumption
survival—which implies at most a 5% probability of lifetime ruin—then she must have
wealth of at least 15.55 times her desired consumption.
Note from Table 5.1, that ψ(w, x) < ψ0(w, x), as expected, because the probability
of lifetime ruin should be less when the individual’s investment opportunities expand to
include annuities. On the other hand, the optimal investment in the risky asset increases
with respect to wealth in the presence of annuities for this particular example (i.e., λS =
0.04 is sufficiently larger than r = 0.02), but it decreases when the individual cannot buy
annuities. Young (2004) showed the latter, but π∗ might increase or decrease when the
individual can buy annuities, depending on the magnitude of λS relative to r; see the
discussion immediately following (5.19). Note also that we have π∗(w , 1) > w for some
values of wealth; thus, the individual borrows in order to invest in the risky asset. In
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particular, at the lower wealth levels, the optimal strategy is a heavily leveraged position
in the risky asset. This occurs because π is unconstrained and also perhaps because of
the binary nature of the investor’s goal. We comment on the constrained problem in
Section 7.
EXAMPLE 5.2. Benefit of Dynamic Portfolio Management and Annuity Purchase: Re-
call that in Section 2.1, we computed the probability of lifetime ruin under the assumption
of exponential future lifetime for an individual with wealth $1 who invests in the riskless
asset only and self-annuitizes, that is, who consumes c = λ + r per year, the amount
of life-annuity income that $1 would provide. In this example, we quantify the benefit
of dynamic portfolio management and the purchase of a life annuity by computing the
probability of lifetime ruin for an individual who consumes c = λ + r per year and by
contrasting the results with those of Section 2.1.
As in Example 5.1, we choose λS = λO = λ = 0.04, r = 0.02, μ = 0.06, and σ = 0.2. In
the deterministic case, an individual with initial wealth $1 who self-annuitizes consumes
c = λ + r = 0.06 per year. By the results of Section 2.1, namely equation (2.7), we have





If life annuities are available, an investor with wealth $1 can purchase a life annu-
ity to provide the desired income c = λ + r; therefore, the probability of lifetime is
zero when wealth equals $1. Moreover, Figure 5.1 shows that ψ(w , 0.06) < 0.444 for














Ruin Prob. with Dynamic Portfolio Mgmt. and Annuity Purchase
Ruin Prob. in Deterministic Case with Self-Annuitization
FIGURE 5.1. With dynamic portfolio management and life annuity purchasing, an
individual can maintain the same consumption level with lower ruin probabilities, even
with lower wealth.
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w ∈ (0.5, 1). Thus, dynamic portfolio management and a life annuity purchase yield
lower ruin probabilities, even with lower wealth.
6. SOLUTION OF THE FREE-BOUNDARY PROBLEM:
GENERAL HAZARD RATE
In the previous section, we observed that if we assume constant hazard rate, we can derive
an implicit analytical solution to the free-boundary problem. Under more general mor-
tality assumptions, there is no implicit analytical solution to the free-boundary problem
given by (4.8), (4.11), and (4.12).
In this section, we exploit the connection between solutions of free-boundary prob-
lems and value functions for optimal stopping problems (Øksendal 1998). We recast our
free-boundary problem as a variational inequality for the value function of an optimal
stopping problem.
We employ the projected SOR method (Wilmott, Dewynne, and Howison 2000) to
calculate the solution of the free-boundary problem numerically. We check that in the
case of constant force of mortality, the results of our numerical method agree with those
in Example 5.1. We, then, consider several examples in which we examine the effect on
the ruin probability and on the optimal investment strategy of changing the mortality
assumptions and the parameters of the financial model.
6.1. Optimal Stopping Formulation
In this section, we propose an optimal stopping problem whose value function f̂
corresponds with the solution f̃ of the free-boundary problem (4.8), (4.11), and (4.12).
Equations (4.11) and (4.12) motivate us to define a penalty function u by












We consider this function because it is maximal among those functions that are concave
in y and satisfy the boundary conditions in (4.11) and (4.12). Recall that f̃ is concave
and increasing in y. Thus, f̃ (y, t) ≤ u(y, t) for all (y, t) such that yb(t) ≤ y ≤ y0(t).




Yt = y > 0.
(6.2)
Finally, consider the optimal stopping problem given by





Ys ds + u(Yτ , τ ) | Yt = y
]
.(6.3)
One can think of this problem as awarding a “player” the running penalty Ys between
time t and the time of stopping τ . At the time of stopping, the player receives the penalty
u(Y τ , τ ). Thus, at each point in time, the player has to decide whether it is better to
continue receiving the running penalty Ys or to stop and take the final penalty u(Y τ , τ ).
By Øksendal (1998, Chapter 10), the value function f̂ of the optimal stopping problem
solves the variational inequality
max
[ − f̂ t + r y f̂ y − my2 f̂ yy − y, f̂ − u] = 0,(6.4)
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If the variational inequality in (6.4) has a smooth solution, then it is the smooth solution
of the free-boundary problem given by (4.8), (4.11), and (4.12), which in turn is the
transformed smooth solution of (3.3). Friedman and Shen (2002) prove the existence of
a unique, continuous solution to a similar variational inequality; they prove that this
solution has locally bounded derivatives.
Øksendal (1998, Section 10.4) studies such optimal stopping problems and proves a
verification theorem that we can apply as follows: If we can show that
ut(y, t) − r yuy(y, t) + my2uyy(y, t) + y ≥ 0,(6.5)
for y > y0(t) and for y < yb(t), and if f̃ is sufficiently regular, then f̂ = f̃ . Thus, to
numerically solve for f̃ , we can use algorithms developed for optimal stopping problems
and solve for f̂ , the value function of the optimal stopping problem.
It remains for us to verify that inequality (6.5) holds. Indeed, for y < yb(t), we have
that u(y, t) = ā(t)y, so that
ut(y, t) − r yuy(y, t) + my2uyy(y, t) + y
= [−1 + (r + λO(t))ā(t)]y − r yā(t) + y
= λO(t)ā(t)y ≥ 0,
(6.6)
so (6.5) holds here. For y > y0(t), we have that u(y, t) = exp(−
∫ t
0 λ
S(v) dv), so that








and this expression is nonnegative for all y > y0(t) if and only if








Inequality (6.8) holds if the hazard rate used in pricing λO(t) is increasing with
respect to age, and if λS(t) ≤ r + λO(t). Indeed, y0(t) = −fz(0, t). By convexity of f ,
the slope of f at the point (0, exp(− ∫ t0 λS(v) dv)) is less than the slope of the se-
cant from the point (0, exp(− ∫ t0 λS(v) dv)) to the point (ā(t), 0). That is, fz(0, t) ≤
















because λO(t) is increasing.
6.2. The Numerical Method
In this section, we briefly describe the numerical treatment of the variational inequal-
ity (6.4). Because (6.4) is similar to the variational inequality associated with pricing
an American option, we employ the projected SOR method, as described in Wilmott,
Dewynne, and Howison (2000), to find the solution f̂ of (6.4) and to recover the free
boundary. The projected SOR method is an iterative method for solving the partial dif-
ferential equation from (6.4), namely,
− f̂ t(y, t) + ry f̂ y(y, t) − my2 f̂ yy(y, t) − y = 0, y ∈ (yb(t), y0(t)),(6.10)
subject to the inequality constraint from (6.4), namely,
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f̂ (y, t) ≤ u(y, t), y ∈ (yb(t), y0(t)).(6.11)
We solve the constrained partial differential equation on a domain that properly contains
the free boundary and then recover the location of the free boundary after computing
the solution. The boundary points yb(t) and y0(t) are the points at which the inequality
in (6.11) changes to equality. Øksendal (1998, Section 10.4) ensures that f̂ also solves the
free-boundary problem (4.8), (4.11), and (4.12).
To employ the projected SOR method, we
1. Transform the degenerate problem in (6.10) and (6.11) on (0, ∞) to a non-
degenerate problem on R via the standard transformation ξ = ln y.
2. Solve the transformed variational inequality via the projected SOR method and
recover the location of the free boundary.
3. Invert the dual transform as in Section 5 to recover V (z, t) from f̂ (z, t).
4. Numerically approximate the optimal investment in the risky asset π∗(z, t).
We tested this numerical scheme by using it to calculate the probability of lifetime ruin
and the corresponding optimal investment strategy for the scenario in Example 5.1 with
constant hazard rate. Our computed solution matched those given in Example 5.1, so we
are confident in the validity of our numerical scheme.
6.3. Examples
In this section, we consider several examples. We begin with a base scenario and then
examine the effect on the ruin probability and optimal investment strategy of changing the
mortality assumptions and the parameters of the financial model. We take the following
as our base scenario:
Base Scenario: Consistent with the mortality assumptions in Milevsky and Young (2003) and
Huang, Milevsky, and Wang (2004), we use the Gompertz hazard rate λO(t) =
exp( t − m̄b )/b, where m̄ is a modal value and b is a scale parameter. Note that the
hazard rate increases exponentially with age. We choose m̄ = 90 and b = 9. Also, let
λS(t) = λO(t) + η, where η is a parameter that quantifies the individual’s mortality
relative to the pricing mortality. To begin, we let η = 0. t = 50; the investor is 50 years old. r = 0.02; the riskless rate of return is 2% over inflation. μ = 0.06; the drift on the risky asset is 6% over inflation. σ = 0.20; the volatility of the risky asset is 20%. c = 1; the individual consumes one unit of wealth per year. A = 0; without loss of generality, we assume that annuity income is zero. It follows
that x = c − A = 1, and z = w/x = w .
In the experiments that follow, we examine the impact on the ruin probability and
optimal investment strategy of varying individual parameters from the values given above.
EXAMPLE 6.1. Impact of Attained Age: Figure 6.1 shows the ruin probability ψ(w ,
1, t) and optimal investment in the risky asset π∗(w , 1, t) for the base scenario described
above (i.e., for t = 50) as well as for ages t = 30 and 70. We note that the ruin probability
and optimal investment in the risky asset decrease as age increases. Thus, a younger
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Ruin Probability and Optimal Investment Strategy for Base Scenario: Impact of Changing Attained Age


































FIGURE 6.1. Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies as we vary the at-
tained age t.
investor with wealth w ∈ (0, ā(t)) is more likely to ruin than an older investor with the
same wealth. In addition, the younger individual will invest more in the risky asset than
an older individual with the same wealth. This result is consistent with our financial
intuition. Note that for some values of wealth, because we did not constrain π∗ in our
problem formulation and perhaps because of the all-or-nothing nature of the investor’s
objective, the investment in the risky asset exceeds current wealth.
EXAMPLE 6.2. Impact of Stock Volatility: We next examine the impact of changing
the volatility σ of the stock return. Specifically, we consider σ = 0.1, 0.2, and 0.5. We
observe (not shown here) that for fixed wealth, the ruin probability increases and the
optimal investment in the risky asset decreases with σ . This is consistent with our financial
intuition.
EXAMPLE 6.3. Impact of Individual-Specific Mortality (Gompertz): We examine the
impact of individual-specific mortality on the ruin probability and optimal investment
strategy. We use the Gompertz assumption described above as the pricing mortality λO(t),
and we define the individual-specific mortality by λS(t) = λO(t) + η for η = −0.005, 0,
and 0.005. (For this example, we consider a 65-year-old investor in order to avoid negative
force of mortality.) We observe (not shown here) that individual-specific mortality has
little impact on the probability of lifetime ruin. This occurs because the investor adjusts
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her investment strategy to compensate for the change in mortality; in effect, the change
in strategy neutralizes the impact on the ruin probability of the change in subjective
mortality. Indeed, an individual with lower mortality (and thus a longer investment
horizon) invests more in the risky asset, which is consistent with Example 6.1.
Huang, Milevsky, and Wang (2004) examined lifetime ruin probability for an individual
who invests in the risky asset only and who purchases no life annuities. They show that
the probability of lifetime ruin for a 65-year-old with initial wealth $20 who consumes
c = 1 per year is approximately 0.57. They also show that in order to sustain annual
consumption of c = 1 with a ruin probability of 0.05, a 70-year-old requires initial wealth
of $27. In our model, a 65-year-old with only $17.05 can purchase a life annuity to provide
the desired consumption c = 1 with zero probability of ruin. Moreover, a 65-year-old
individual needs only $15.67 to sustain consumption of c = 1 with ruin probability 0.05.
Thus we see that, with dynamic portfolio management and life annuities, one can sustain
the desired level of consumption with the same (or lower) ruin probability with lower
wealth. (We remark that the parameter values in Huang, Milevsky, and Wang [2004]
differ slightly from ours, but this does not change the qualitative comparison of the
results.)
EXAMPLE 6.4. Impact of Individual-Specific Mortality (Constant Hazard Rate): We
repeat the analysis of Example 6.3, but with constant hazard rate instead of the Gompertz
hazard rate. We use pricing mortality λO = 0.04 and consider an individual whose specific
mortality is given by λS = λO + η for η = −0.015, 0, and 0.015. We see in Figure 6.2 that
the effect on the investment strategy is pronounced. In particular, for λS = 0.055 and























































FIGURE 6.2. Constant hazard rate: Impact of individual-specific mortality.
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FIGURE 6.3. Both mortality assumptions above yield the same annuity price, but the
shape of the hazard rate has significant impact on the optimal investment strategy.
λS = 0.04, the optimal investment in the risky asset increases with wealth. For λS =
0.025, it decreases with wealth. In Example 6.3, under Gompertz mortality, the optimal
investment in the risky asset decreased with wealth regardless of λS.
EXAMPLE 6.5. Impact of Pricing Mortality: In Figure 6.3, we examine the impact of
changing the objective (pricing) mortality assumption for a 50-year-old whose specific
mortality λS equals the pricing mortality λO. More specifically, we examine the ruin prob-
ability and optimal strategy under two different mortality assumptions that yield the same
price for a life annuity. For our base scenario, we assume Gompertz mortality with the
parameters given above. Under this assumption, the price of the annuity is ā(50) = 24.75.
We contrast the ruin probability and optimal strategy under Gompertz mortality with
the results under constant hazard rate with λS = λO = 0.0204 (so that ā(50) = 24.75).
The first two graphs in Figure 6.3 show the hazard rates and corresponding survival
probabilities. The fourth graph shows that the change in the mortality assumption has a
dramatic impact on the optimal investment strategy. Thus, although both assumptions
yield the same annuity price, the shape of the hazard rate has a significant effect on the
optimal strategy. Under Gompertz mortality, the individual invests more in the risky asset
at lower wealth levels because of the higher survival probability in the early years. As in
the previous experiment, there is little change in the probability of ruin, as can be seen in
the third graph of Figure 6.3.
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we derived the optimal investment and annuitization strategy for a retiree
whose objective is to minimize the probability of lifetime ruin, namely the probability
that a fixed consumption strategy will lead to zero wealth while the individual is still alive.
We obtained a variety of interesting results. First, given the all-or-nothing objective, we
found that the ruin-minimizing annuitization strategies are of the bang-bang, as opposed
to gradual, type. In several of the numerical examples, we saw that the ruin probabil-
ity and optimal strategies respond in an intuitive and predictable way to changes in the
model parameters. However, the impact of the mortality assumption, and in particular,
the shape of the hazard rate function, can be significant. Under some mortality assump-
tions, the optimal investment in the risky asset increases with wealth, while under other
assumptions, it decreases.
For constant hazard rate, we explicitly showed the advantage of including annuities in
the market from the standpoint of reducing the probability of lifetime ruin. When the
hazard rate is more general, such as Gompertz, one can demonstrate that a similar advan-
tage holds. See Moore and Young (2006) for the method to solve the ruin minimization
problem when life annuities are not available in the market.
Finally, we note that we considered an unconstrained optimization problem; we did
not restrict the investment in the risky asset to be less than or equal to current wealth, for
example. Because of this and because of the binary nature of the investor’s objective, in
several examples, the optimal strategy was a heavily leveraged position in the risky asset.
We plan to address this by considering the constrained problem in future work.
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